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This paper examines interfirm knowledge transfers within strategic alliances. Using a new
measure of changes in alliance partners' technological capabilities, based on the citation
patterns of their patent portfolios. we analyze changes in the extent to which partner firms'
technological resources 'overlap' as a result of alliance participation. This measure allows us
to test hypothesesfrom the literature on interfirm knowledge transfer in alliances, with interesting
results: we find support for some elements of this 'received wisdom'-equity arrangements
promote greater knowledge transfer, and 'absorptive capacity' helps explain the extent of
technological capability transfer, at least in some alliances. But the results also suggest limits
to the 'capabilities acquisition' view of strategic alliances. Consistent with the argument that
alliance activity can promote increased specialization, we find that the capabilities of partner
firms become more divergent in a substantial subset of alliances.
INTRODUCTION
Recent literature on the role of firm-specific
knowledge in competitive strategy has spawned
several theoretical perspectives. The 'resource-
based' view of the firm describes the business
enterprise as a collection of sticky and difficult-
to-imitate resources (Penrose, 1959; Barney,
1986; Wemerfelt, 1984), stressing the capture of
rents through the protection and deployment of
these resources. A related literature on 'dynamic
capabilities' emphasizes the importance of change
in the capabilities underpinning these resources
(Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997; Teece and Pis-
ano, 1994), focusing in particular on the develop-
ment, more than the exploitation, of firm-specific
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resources. Recent 'knowledge-based' views of the
firm focus on knowledge as a key competitive
asset, and emphasize the capacity of the firm to
integrate tacit knowledge (Grant and Baden-
Fuller, 1995; Conner and Prahalad, 1996).
A central factor in the 'dynamic capabilities'
view of firm strategy is the acquisition of new
capabilities through organizational learning. One
device cited in this literature as an important
tactic for organizational learning is the strategic
alliance,I now an important element of contem-
porary firms' competitive strategies (Harrigan,
I 'The concept of dynamic capabilities as a coordinate man-
agement process opens the door to the potential for inter-
organizational learning. Researchers ... have pointed out that
collaborations and partnerships can be vehicles for new organi-
zational learning, helping firms to recognize dysfunctional
routines, and preventing strategic blindspots' (Teece and Pis-
ano, 1994:545).
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1988; Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1990; Eisen-
hardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). A number of
scholars have described the use of alliances by
firms to acquire technology-based capabilities
from alliance partners, and an extensive literature
discusses the features of alliances and their parti-
cipants that facilitate the flow of technology-
based capabilities and other knowledge among
partners (e.g., Kogut, 1988; Hamel, Doz, and
Prahalad, 1989; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990;
Hamel, 1991). Alliances may serve other pur-
poses, however, and recent work on alliances and
the role of firm-specific knowledge in firm strat-
egy suggests additional motives and effects of
alliance formation. Rather than using alliances to
acquire capabilities, scholars suggest that firms
use interfirm collaboration to gain access to other
firms' capabilities, supporting more focused,
intensive exploitation of existing capabilities
within each firm (Grant and Baden-Fuller, 1995;
Nakamura, Shaver, and Yeung, 1996).2
Empirical assessment of the importance and
validity of these contrasting views, as well as
broader empirical research on the role of knowl-
edge within the firm and alliances within firm
strategy, has been hampered by the widespread
reliance on anecdotes and assertion, rather than
statistical evidence. The lack of empirical work
documenting the effects of participation in
alliances on firms' technological capabilities is
attributable in part to the difficulty of measuring
the technological and other capabilities of firms.
This paper analyzes the effects of interfirm
knowledge transfers within strategic alliances on
partner firms' technological capabilities, using a
new measure of change in these capabilities.
Using the citation patterns of partner firms' patent
portfolios, we measure changes in the extent to
which their technological resources 'overlap' with
their partners' technological portfolios as a result
of participation in an alliance. This methodology
represents a significant advance on previous
analysis of changing firm capabilities, which have
relied on broad firm-level measures such as R&
2 As Hamel points out, 'the crucial distinction between acquir-
ing such skills in the sense of gaining access to them ...
and actually internalizing a partner's skills has seldom been
clearly drawn '" For the partners, an alliance may be not
only a means for trading access to each other's skills-what
might be termed quasi-internalization, but also a mechanism
for actually acquiring a partner's skills-de facto internaliza-
tion' (1991: 84; emphasis in original).
D spending or raw counts of patents issued to
partner firms.
Our new measure allows us to test a number
of hypotheses from the literature on interfirm
transfer of capabilities in alliances. We find sup-
port for some elements of this 'received
wisdom' -equity arrangements support greater
transfer of technological capabilities (Kogut,
1988) and 'absorptive capacity' (Cohen and Lev-
inthal, 1990) helps explain the effectiveness of
technology-based capability transfer, at least in
some types of alliances. But the empirical analy-
sis also suggests that there are limits to the
'capabilities acquisition' view of alliances. Con-
sistent with the view that alliance activity can
lead to increased specialization, as firms access
others' capabilities (rather than acquiring them or
developing them internally), we find that the
capabilities of partner firms become more diver-
gent in a substantial subset of alliances.
Immediately below, we describe recent trends
in alliance formation, summarizing current under-
standing of the motives for collaboration and the
prominence of knowledge acquisition in recent
discussions of strategic alliances. We then survey
the literature on interfirm knowledge transfer in
alliances, outlining some hypotheses based on this
literature. This section is followed by a discussion
of measures of technological capabilities and a
description of the patent citation data used in our
study. The following section briefly describes our
data and empirical methods, and the next two
sections of the paper present the empirical results
and a concluding discussion of their implications.
TRENDS AND MOTIVES IN
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
Strategic alliances are not new phenomena-they
have been important in international business
since the turn of the century (Harrigan, 1986)
when joint ventures were formed primarily as a
vehicle for the exploitation of natural resources.
Nonetheless, the rate of formation of alliances
has increased significantly over the last two dec-
ades and the motives for their establishment have
shifted, as alliances have become widespread in
technology-intensive industries (e.g., semiconduc-
tors, computers, software, commercial aircraft) in
which they were of little or no importance prior
to 1975. In addition, the activities included in
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many of the alliances of the past 20 years, such as
joint R&D and product development, can involve
higher levels of knowledge exchange and tech-
nology transfer among participants.
Motives for the formation of these more recent
alliances include the need to spread the costs and
risks of innovation, as capital requirements for
development projects in industries such as
pharmaceuticals, telecommunications and com-
mercial aircraft have risen (Mowery, 1988).
Higher development costs and risks, along with
a perceived shrinkage in product life-cycles, also
mean that rapid penetration of foreign markets is
more important than ever in many technology-
intensive industries-something which may be
more easily achieved through an alliance. Still
other alliances focus on collaboration between
users and suppliers of new products as a means
of coordinating and formulating technical stan-
dards and 'dominant designs' (Grindley, 1995).
Strategic motives also play a role in alliances
that are formed to facilitate strategic coordination
among competitors to increase market power
(e.g., Porter and Fuller, 1986; Hagedoorn, 1993).
One of the most widely cited motives for
collaboration, linked to many of those just
described, is the acquisition of new technical
skills or technological capabilities from partner
firms (Mariti and Smiley, 1983; Hamel et al.,
1989; Shan, 1990; Hamel, 1991; Powell and
Brantley, 1992; Mody, 1993; Khanna, 1996).
Alliances have advantages over conventional con-
tracts or markets for this task because firm-spe-
cific technological capabilities frequently are
based on tacit knowledge and are subject to
considerable uncertainty concerning their charac-
teristics and performance. These features make it
difficult to draft simple contracts governing the
sale or licensing of such capabilities (Mowery,
1983; Pisano, 1990).3 By combining some of the
incentive structures of markets with the monitor-
ing capabilities and administrative controls asso-
ciated with hierarchy (internal organization),
alliances can provide a superior means to gain
access to technological and other complex capa-
bilities. In fact, alliances run the gamut from
J Other firm-specific capabilities include knowledge of specific
markets or user needs, idiosyncratic, firm-specific 'routines',
such as decision-making techniques or management systems,
and complex networks for handling the marketing and distri-
bution of products that include procedures for the docu-
mentation and analysis of user feedback.
fairly simple unilateral (i.e., 'technology for
cash') contracts, such as licensing, through more
complex contractually based arrangements, such
as technology sharing and joint development
agreements (which often include joint ownership
or other organizational mechanisms for oversight
and management), to 'pure' equity joint ventures,
where ownership in a separately incorporated
entity is shared by the partner firms (see Figure
1).4
The received wisdom on interfirm capabilities
transfer implicitly assumes that the acquisition of
technology-based capabilities is an important goal
and effect of interfirm collaboration, and scholars
have examined the factors that facilitate knowl-
edge transfer among partner firms. This literature
yields a number of testable empirical implications,
which form the basis for the empirical hypotheses
on the role of alliances in interfirm knowledge





Our empirical investigation focuses on transfer of
technological capabilities among alliance partners.
Specifically, we are interested in how collabo-
ration changes the relationship between a firm's
technological portfolio and those of its alliance
partner(s). If collaboration results in the interfirm
transfer of technological capabilities, then
alliances should produce higher levels of techno-
logical 'overlap' among partner firms and
increased similarity in their technology portfolios
(Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman, 1997).
The previous literature provides a number of
testable statements about factors influencing the
extent of interfirm knowledge transfer in alliances.
Kogut (1988) argues that the opportunities for
interfirm transfer of capabilities afforded by dif-
ferent alliance structures influences the choice
among them, since equity-based joint ventures
are more effective vehicles for the transfer of tacit
knowledge between the partners: 'Other forms of
4 The 'other' category of alliance forms in Figure I includes
second sourcing and coproduction agreements, joint research
pacts and research corporations. 'Mixed modes' are primarily
licensing agreements combined with equity exchanges.


















Figure 1. Variety in alliance forms
Source: CATI Database
transfer, such as through licensing, are ruled out
. . . because the very knowledge that is being
transferred is organizationally embedded' (Kogut,
1988: 323). This observation underpins our first
hypothesis:
Hypothesis Ia: Interfirm transfer of techno-
logical capabilities will be enhanced in equity
joint ventures; participants will display higher
increases in technological overlap after forma -
tion of equity joint ventures than after forma-
tion of contract-based alliances.
An extension of this logic suggests that interfirm
knowledge transfers should be more limited in
'unilateral' contract-based alliances, such as
licensing agreements. The technology that is
exchanged for cash payments in these undertak-
ings generally is more tightly 'packaged' than is
the case in bilateral contractual arrangements such
as technology sharing or joint development agree-
ments. As a result, 'unilateral' alliances create
fewer opportunities for interfirm knowledge trans-
fer.
Hypothesis Ib: Participants in unilateral
contract-based alliances will display a lower
increase in technological overlap after the for-
mation of the alliance than participants in
bilateral contract-based alliances.
However, the transfer of technological capabilities
is by no means an assured outcome, even within
equity-based joint ventures. Cohen and Levinthal
(1990) argue that a necessary condition for a
firm's successful exploitation of technological
capabilities or knowledge outside its boundaries
is development within the firm of the ability to
absorb such capabilities. This 'absorptive
capacity' requires that a firm have considerable
in-house expertise that complements the tech-
nology activities of its alliance partner. Absorp-
tive capacity results from a prolonged process of
investment and knowledge accumulation within
the firm, and its development is path-dependent;
a firm's current absorptive capacity is influenced
by its historic participation in specific product
markets, lines of R&D, and other technical activi-
ties."
There are few direct tests of the hypothesized
influence of absorptive capacity, but the results of
such tests (e.g., Gambardella, 1992) are broadly
~ ' . . . prior knowledge pennits the assimilation and exploi-
tation of new knowledge. Some portion of that prior knowl-
edge should be very closely related to the new knowledge to
facilitat e assimilation .. . Accumulating absorptive capacity in
one period will permit its more efficient accumulation in the
next. By having already developed some absorptive capacity
in a particular area, a finn may more readily accumulate what
additional knowledge it needs in the subsequent periods in
order to exploit any critical external knowledge that may
become available ' (Cohen and Levinthal , 1990: 135-136 ).
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supportive of the argument that higher levels of
absorptive capacity improve a firm's ability to
exploit sources of technical knowledge outside its
boundaries. Moreover, a parallel line of research
in the broader technology transfer literature sug-
gests that possession of relevant technical skills
facilitates inward technology transfer (e.g.,
Rosenberg and Frischtak, 1991; Agmon and von
Glinow, 1991). Still other research indicates that
firms tend to establish alliances with firms that
have overlapping technological capabilities
(Mowery et al., 1997).
A firm's absorptive capacity for learning from
its alliance partners should depend on its endow-
ment of relevant technology-based capabilities
upon entering an alliance. R&D investment is
a necessary (although not necessarily sufficient)
condition for the creation of absorptive
capacity-indeed, both Cohen and Levinthal's
original test and Gambardella's subsequent exam-
ination of the issue use R&D intensity as a proxy
for absorptive capacity. It is also plausible that
larger firms have more diverse technological port-
folios and therefore are more likely to possess
technology that is 'relevant' to the alliance in
question. Although both of these measures merit
empirical testing, neither one provides the level
of disaggregation and specificity of our patent-
based measure of interfirm knowledge transfer
(see below). We therefore include in our tests of
the importance of absorptive capacity a more
narrowly focused measure of absorptive capacity:
the prealliance levels of technological overlap
among the partners. Since absorptive capacity
develops over time in a path-dependent fashion,
substantial prealliance overlap between partners'
technological portfolios should enhance their
capacity to absorb new competencies from one
another. Taken together, these arguments lead to
the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a: The extent of a finn's absorp-
tion of technological capabilities from its
alliance partners will be positively related to
its prealliance level of technological overlap
wth partner firms.
Hypothesis 2b: The extent of a finn's absorp-
tion of technological capabilities from its
alliance partners will be positively related to
its R&D intensity.
Hypothesis 2c: The extent of a finn's absorp-
tion of technological capabilities from its
alliance partners will be positively related to
its size.
Another aspect of interfirm learning that is closely
related to absorptive capacity and receives atten-
tion in the alliance literature concerns the extent
to which firms enter into an alliance with the
'intent to learn' (Hamel, 1991). This argument
appears in a number of critical commentaries on
the alleged tendencies of U.S. firms to weaken
their technological capabilities in alliances with
foreign-primarily Japanese-firms (e.g., Reich
and Mankin, 1986). Although there is evidence
to the contrary (Mowery, 1988), some anecdotal
and case-based research suggests the presence
of asymmetries or differential rates of capability
acquisition by U.S. and Japanese firms in
alliances between them. Hamel et al. assert that
in several U.S.-Japanese alliances, where the
Japanese company emerged from an alliance
stronger than its partner, 'the Japanese company
had made a greater effort to learn' (1989: 134).
Discussing a 20-year alliance with a Japanese
firm, an executive of a U.S. industrial products
company claimed: 'We established them in their
core business. They learned the business from us,
mastered our process technology ... and today
challenge us outside Japan' (Hamel 1991: 86).
Other evidence from Mansfield (1988), drawing
on a survey of U.S. and Japanese firms, suggests
that Japanese firms are more effective in commer-
cializing innovations based on external sources of
technology than are U.S. firms, a finding that is
consistent with the presence within Japanese firms
of a greater 'intent to learn' from external
sources.
These examples may not be representative of
the broader historical experience of U.S.-
Japanese alliances, nor are the mechanisms that
underpin the development and maintenance of
such 'national traits' in business firms clearly
articulated in this literature. The argument never-
theless has been extended to non-Japanese foreign
firms: Hamel (1991) suggests that British firms
share the alleged arrogance and lack of receptivity
of U.S. firms and that French firms' ability to
build competencies and learn from alliances
approaches that of the Japanese. These arguments
are based on extraordinarily broad generalizations
from minimal evidence, but they occupy a promi-
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nent position in the received wisdom on alliances,
and yield the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Japanese companies will
absorb more of the technological capabilities
of alliance partners than will firms from
other countries.
Before discussing our methods for testing these
hypotheses, we must address another issue. Sig-
nificant interfirm knowledge transfer should be
reflected in higher levels of technological overlap
following the formation of an alliance. But par-
ticipation in alliances need not always increase
technological overlap. Instead, an alliance may
enable one firm to gain access to key knowledge-
based capabilities of another without internalizing
or acquiring that capability, e.g., in an alliance
in which one firm designs and the other manufac-
tures an advanced semiconductor device. Among
these alliances, interfirm knowledge transfer may
be limited to only the codified information neces-
sary to coordinate otherwise separable activities
that draw on different 'knowledge domains'
(Grant and Baden-Fuller, 1995). Thus, if an
alliance enables its members to specialize in dif-
ferent but complementary areas of technology,
partner firms may experience divergence in tech-
nological capabilities over the course of the
alliance (reflected in lower levels of technological
overlap), rather than convergence. Indeed, Naka-
mura et al. (1996) find evidence that in some
cases joint venture partners display 'convergent
development' (i.e., increasingly similar
capabilities), but that other alliances produce
divergence in the capabilities of partner firms.
If some alliances increase technological overlap
while others promote specialization, then tests
that assume convergent development through
interfirm knowledge transfer (and consequently
an unambiguous increase in postalliance techno-
logical overlap) are likely to produce inconclusive
results, as was the case in Mowery et al. (1997).
One test for alliance effects in the presence of
both convergent and divergent development
examines the absolute value of changes in techno-
logical overlap. If allying firms exhibit stronger
changes in the extent of their technological over-
lap than nonallying firms-in either a positive
(convergent) or negative (divergent) direction-
then the changes in technological overlap by
convergent and divergent alliances might offset
one another, but the absolute value of these
changes should be significantly larger than that
of nonallying firms:
Hypothesis 4a: The presence of divergence
and convergence within the alliance population
will prevent the observation of a consistent
postalliance increase in the technological over-
lap of alliance partner firms.
Hypothesis 4b: The absolute value of the pre-
vs. postcollaboration changes in technological
overlap will be greater for alliance partners
than for a similar sample of nonallying firm




There is little empirical research on interfirm
transfer of technological capabilities in strategic
alliances, and most such work emphasizes case
studies or small-scale surveys (for other
examples, see Lyles, 1988; Sobrero and Roberts,
1996). These gaps reflect the lack of reliable
measures of the technology-based capabilities of
partner firms and a corresponding absence of
measures of change in capabilities. Recent work
on the resource-based view of the firm has faced
similar difficulties. Although much of that
research focuses on narrowly defined firm-specific
capabilities in its conceptual discussion, most
empirical tests of propositions in the resource-
based view rely on broad measures that are sub-
ject to many interpretations. Corporate R&D
intensity, for example, has frequently been used
as a proxy for technological resources (e.g.,
Montgomery and Hariharan, 1991; Nakamura et
al., 1996), despite the fact that R&D intensity
measures inputs to the creation of capabilities
and indicates little if anything about resultant
changes in capabilities." More recent empirical
6 For example, Nakamura et al. (1996) rely on measured
changes in alliance members' R&D intensity and foreign sales
(as a share of corporate sales) in assessing the 'divergent' or
'convergent' effects of alliance membership. However, it is
difficult to interpret changes in such corporate-wide measures
as tracking the effects of alliances that may span only a
single line of business or a single product within a line
of business.
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work in this tradition has measured firms' techni-
cal resources with patent data (Silverman, 1996;
Mowery et al., 1997), which offers significant
advantages over alternative measures such as R&
D spending; patents are better measures of the
output of R&D activities, the key concern for
capabilities development. Moreover, patents pro-
vide a more disaggregated measure of changing
technological portfolios for examining the effects
of alliance activities (see Griliches, 1990; and
Silverman, 1996, for further discussion).
Our empirical approach focuses on the citation
patterns in a firm's patent portfolio, which allows
us to observe changes in the relationship of one
firm's technology portfolio to that of a partner
firm. The measure shares some of the limitations
of other patent-based measures (such as raw pat-
ent counts): the commercial importance of patents
varies among industries and technologies, and
firms therefore may display systematic differences
in their propensity to seek patent protection for
important technical advances. More importantly,
patents are by definition examples of codified
knowledge, and citation measures therefore may
not capture flows of the tacit knowledge that
often forms the basis for firm-specific capabilities.
Tacit knowledge flows are virtually impossible to
measure, however, and we assume that the codi-
fied knowledge represented by patents and tacit
knowledge are complements, rather than substi-
tutes, and that codified knowledge flows and the
tacit knowledge flows of interest are closely
linked. There is considerable support for this
assumption (Patel and Pavitt, 1994).
When the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
grants a patent, the granting officer includes a
list of all previous patents on which the granted
patent is based." Citations of prior patents thus
serve as an indicator of the technological lineage
of new patents, much as bibliographic citations
indicate the intellectual lineage of academic
research. As Firm; acquires technological knowl-
edge from its partner in an alliance, Firm, we
should see a higher rate of citation of Firm/s
patents in new patents applied for by Firm, We
7 The patent officer is aided in this task by the patent appli-
cant, whose application usually provides a list of all patents
for relevant 'prior art'. It is in the applicants' interest to be
forthcoming in this list because a more complete description
of prior art is likely to reduce the prospects of an interference
being declared during processing of a patent application.
refer to this as 'cross-citation rate (Firm., Firm).'
More precisely, the measure is defined as follows:
Cross-citation rate (Firm., Firm)
Citations to Firmj patents in Firm;'s patents
= Total citations in Firm ;'s patents
The cross-citation rate provides a measure of the
relative importance of Firm, in Firm;'s external
technology 'pool'. An increase in this measure is
an indication of the degree to which Firm; is
acquiring technology-based capabilities from
Firm; i.e., of the extent of interfirm knowledge
transfer in the alliance and of the 'technological
overlap' between the two companies.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: SAMPLE
AND METHODS
We tested our hypotheses by exammmg cross-
citation rates for partners in bilateral alliances
that involved at least one U.S. firm and were
established during 1985 and 1986. The sample
was taken from the Cooperative Agreements and
Technology Indicators (CAT!) data base, a com-
prehensive data set that contains information on
over 9000 alliances involving some 5000 firms
in many industries and countries (Hagedoorn and
Schakenraad, 1990). This data set is based on
systematic examination of secondary reports of
alliance formation, primarily during the 1980s.
Although coverage of the overall population is
inevitably incomplete and significant biases
remain, it is the most comprehensive and reliable
source available for information on alliance
activity in the global economy.
Each alliance in our sample involves at least
one U.S. partner, since we expect interfirm
knowledge transfers in these alliances to be more
reliably associated with changing patterns of
citation to U.S. patents. The years 1985-86 were
chosen as the sample period because these were
years in which alliance formation was at its
height, and together the 2 years yield a sample
size sufficient for the necessary statistical tests.
Restricting the period to as few years as possible
is important, in order to minimize the impact of
overall trends in patenting and citation behavior.
In addition, selecting a period in the mid-1980s
allows straightforward computation of 'before'
and 'after' patent citation rates from the available
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patent data, which covers patents granted between
1975 and 1994 (see below).
The resulting sample contains a total of 792
alliances. Of these, 132 (16%) are equity joint
ventures, 226 (29%) are unilateral contract-based
alliances (i.e., technology licenses, R&D contracts
and second-source agreements) and 434 (55%)
are bilateral contract-based alliances (cross-licens-
ing, joint development and technology sharing
agreement, etc.). In 280 (35%) of the alliances,
both partners are U.S. firms; 102 (13%) have a
Japanese firm partnered with a U.S. firm; the
remaining 410 (52%) involve a country from
elsewhere in the world (but primarily Europe)
partnered with a U.S. company.
In addition to our sample of alliance partners,
we constructed a 'control sample' of nonallied
firms by generating random pairings of firms in
the CATI sample and eliminating any pairs which
were listed as alliance partners anywhere in the
CATI data base. This control sample of 858 firm
pairs thus includes firms known to be active in
alliances, and allows us to compare the change
in citation patterns of alliance partners with those
of a similar sample of nonallying firms, a pro-
cedure that is essential to tests of Hypotheses 4a
and 4b.8
The patent data are drawn from the Micropatent
data base, which contains all information recorded
on the front page of every patent granted in the
United States since 1975. This information
includes the patent number, date of application,
date of grant, company to whom the patent is
assigned (if any) and references to prior patents
for each granted patent. All patents assigned to
the firms appearing in the sample were extracted
from the Micropatent data base and corporate
patent portfolios were constructed for each firm.
Many of the firms in the sample of alliances
are multinational or multidivisional firms (or are
subsidiaries of these firms), which poses a chal-
"The limitations of this approach to control sample construc-
tion and alternative approaches are discussed at length in our
earlier paper (Mowery et al., 1997) where three different
control samples, including both random pairing and matched
pairs, were used. Here we use the firms from our sample of
alliances to construct the control sample. This means that
there are no significant differences in the overall characteristics
of the two samples with respect to such features as industries
or nationalities represented, the size distribution of firms
within the sample, overall patenting and citation rates or
changes in these rates. Ful1 descriptive statistics are available
from the authors upon request.
lenge when constructing the relevant patent port-
folios. Since we focus on firm-specific capabili-
ties, the relevent patent portfolio for the analysis
is the portfolio of the entire firm, rather than for
any single subsidiary. Since firms do not always
assign a patent to the subsidiary in which the
innovation took place and/or where it is used,
construction of a firm-level patent portfolio is
especially important. The first stage in the con-
struction of our sample was to match firms in
the sample with their relevant parent company,
subsidiaries and/or 'sister' subsidiaries, using the
1985 edition of Who Owns Whom (North Amer-
ican Edition). The patent portfolio for each firm
over the period 1975-94 was then created, by
collecting the information on each patent issued
to the relevant parent and all its subsidiaries. The
838 firms in the resulting data set controlled
approximately 14,500 subsidiaries and more than
275,000 patents.
The result of the data collection and tabulation
process is a series of firm-specific patent port-
folios, detailing (for each patent held) the patent
number, application date, issue date, and U.S.
references (U.S. patents cited in the application).
The number and vintage of the patents in each
firm's portfolio vary considerably, and the number
of patents cited in any single patent ranges from
o to approximately 100, with a mean around 10.
The total number of patents cited in Firm/s pat-
ents during the sample period thus varies from 0
to over 10,000. The patent cross-citation rates
were computed for each partner in each alliance
before and after collaboration." Other data on
firm characteristics in 1985 that are featured in
the hypotheses (i.e., R&D spending and firm
size, based on sales) or used as control variables
(primary SIC code) were drawn from Compustat
for U.S. firms and from Compact Disclosure's
'Worldscope Global' data base for non-U.S. firms.
9 The 'before' cross-citation rates are computed based on all
patents applied for after January I, 1979 and issued before
December 31, 1984. Only citations to patents issued after
1975 are included in the calculation, since this is the earliest
year for which patent data are available, and so for patents
issued before that data, the assignee is unknown. 'After'
citation rates refer to patents with applications dated after
January I, 1987 and issued prior to December I, 1994. These
cutoff dates were chosen to ensure that all applications for
patents included in the 'before' calculation were in fact made
before the col1aboration began (i.e., before 1985) and those
in the 'after' were after the latest alliance in the sample was
established (i.e., after 1986).
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Hypotheses 1-3 relate to the extent of changes
in the cross-citation rates of alliance partners that
occur as a consequence of interfirm transfer of
capabilities. But Hypotheses 4a and 4b suggest
that such transfer will not necessarily take place
in divergent alliances, for which an entirely dif-
ferent logic of capability development may apply.
Our research therefore proceeds in two stages:
we first test Hypotheses 4a and 4b to establish
whether the sample includes both divergent and
convergent alliances, and then test the remaining
hypotheses on the convergent sample. Table 1
contains definitions for all the variables used in
the OLS and Tobit regression specifications and
summarizes the models to be estimated for each
hypothesis. The descriptive statistics in Table 2
reveal no systematic differences (except those
related to citation rates) between the sample of
convergent alliances and the overall alliance sam-
ple.
RESULTS
Our empirical results are summarized in Tables
3-5. They provide support for some but not all
of the hypotheses, and some results challenge the
received wisdom on interfirm transfer of capabili-
ties in international alliances. We first tested for
the presence of interfirm knowledge transfer or
'convergent development' in alliances
(Hypotheses 4a and 4b) before going on to exam-
ine the factors that determine the extent of such
transfers. Divergent development should be
reflected in negative values of DPCTCRSS for
the alliance in question, and these observations
may cancel out the positive values of DPCTCRSS
expected in convergent alliances. We investigated
this issue by comparing citation rate changes
for alliance partners with changes in the citation
patterns of our control sample of 'nonallying'
firms. Equation 1 in Table 3 shows the results

























Summed pre-1985 cross-citation rate for a given pair of firms i and j
Post-1986 cross-citation rate minus pre-1985 cross-citation rate for firms i and j
Absolute value of DPCTCRSSij
Post-1986 cross-citation rate minus pre-1985 citation rate for firm i (citing to patents owned
by firm j)
dummy variable, = I if firms i and j are alliance partners, 0 otherwise
dummy variable, = I if alliance involves equity, 0 otherwise
dummy variable, = I if alliance is a unilateral contractual agreement, 0 otherwise
dummy variable, = I if alliance involves a non-U.S. partner, 0 otherwise
dummy variable, = I if alliance partners have the same 4-digit primary SIC code, 0
otherwise
dummy variable, = I if firm i is non-U.S., 0 otherwise
dummy variable, = I if firm i is Japanese, 0 otherwise
Pre-1985 cross-citation rate for firm i (citing to patents owned by firm j)
Square of PRECROSS;
R&D intensity (i.e., 1985 R&D expenses/sales) for firm i
Natural log of U.S. dollar value of 1985 sales for firm i
Model specification(s)
DPCTCRSSij = CONSTANT + EQUlTYij + US-nonUSij + SAMESICij
DPCTCRSSij = CONSTANT + UNlLATij + US-nonUSij + SAMESICij
FlRMLRNij = CONSTANT + EQUlTYij + US-nonUSij + SAMESICij + FORGNCO; +
JAPANCO; + PRECROSS;
FlRMLRNij = CONSTANT + EQUITYij + US-nonUSij + SAMSESICij + FORGNCO; +
JAPANCO; + PRECROSS; + RNDlNT; + LNSALES;
DPCTCRSSij = CONSTANT + ALLlESij + US-nonUSij + SAMESICij
ABSDCRSSij = CONSTANT + ALLlESij + US-nonUSij + SAMESIC;j
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics Table 3. Results on divergence/convergence
(a) Descriptive statistics for alliance sample (ALLIES hypotheses (t-statistics in parentheses)
= I)
I 2
Variable Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum (DPCTCRSS) (ABSDCRSS)
PCTCRSS 0.568 2.532 0.000 50.000 INTERCEPT 0.358*** 0.364***
DPCTCRSS 0.222 3.277 -50.000 40.005 (3.305)
(3.442)
ABSDCRSS 0.771 3.192 0.000 50.000 ALLIES 0.058 0.619***
FIRMLRN 0.111 2.297 -50.000 40.000 (0.433) (4.697)
EQUITY 0.168 0.374 0.000 1.000 US-non US -0.326* -0.201*
UNILAT 0.283 0.451 0.000 1.000 (-2.634) (-1.662)
US-non US 0.653 0.489 0.000 1.000 SAMESIC -0.060 -0.179
SAMESIC 0.075 0.264 0.000 1.000 (-0.298) (-0.916)
FORGNCO 0.326 0.469 0.000 1.000
JAPANCO 0.104 0.306 0.000 1.000 n 1650 1650
PRECROSS 0.284 1.755 0.000 50.000 F-statistic 2.343* 8.131***
RNDlNT 6.169 17.391 0.000 28.960
LNSALES 7.706 2.633 -0.646 11.529 ***Significant at 0.01 level; **significant at 0.05 level;
* significant at 0.1 level.
(b) Descriptive statistics for 'convergent' alliance
sample (i.e., DPCTCRSS > 0)
Variable Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum Table 4. Results on alliance structure hypotheses (chi-
squares in parentheses)
of culture, language, educational background, and
distance associated with domestic alliances should
result in higher levels of knowledge transfer.
Since our sample includes a large number of
'U.S.-U.S.' and 'U.S.-non-U.S.' alliances, we
inserted another control variable. Us-non US, to
distinguish alliances in which U.S. firms were
teamed with foreign enterprises.
Consistent with Hypothesis 4a, we find that
the coefficient on ALLIES in Equation I is very
PCTCRSS 0.376 1.125 0 10.166'
DPCTCRSS 2.059 4.826 0.005 40.005
ABSDCRSS 2.059 4.826 0.005 40.005
FIRMLRN 1.030 3.514 -0.667 40.000
EQUITY 0.204 0.404 0 I
UNILAT 0.204 0.404 0 I
US-non US 0.670 0.471 0 I
SAMESIC 0.079 0.272 0 I
FORGNCO 0.335 0.473 0 I
JAPANCO 0.168 0.374 0 I
PRECROSS 0.186 0.762 0 10.000
RNDlNT 7.371 14.596 0.007 31.739
LNSALES 8.005 2.489 0.861 11.529
of OLS estimation on a pooled sample of 792
alliances (ALLIES =I) and 858 nonallying pairs
(ALLIES =0).
A control variable, SAMES/C, which denotes
alliances made up of firms from the same 4-digit
SIC, is included in this and other specifications
to control for the effects of competition among
alliance members in product markets and potential
similarity in alliance members' product lines,
which otherwise could result in spurious high
levels of cross-citation. We also anticipate that
'domestic' alliances, in which all member firms
share a common home country, are likely to
produce different patterns of interfirm technology
transfer and learning than that found in 'inter-
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Table 5. Results on absorptive capacity hypotheses
(t-statistics in parentheses)
10 This result is similar to findings from our earlier paper,
which analyzed a small sample of alliances (Mowery et al.,
1997). A separate test (not reported here) of another hypoth-
esis from the earlier paper on these data also replicated
the finding that prealliance cross-citation rates positively and
significantly influence partner choice in alliances.
small and stastistically insignificant.10 US-non US
has a negative and significant coefficient, indicat-
ing that international alliances produce less
interfirm exchange of technological capabilities,
and the coefficient for SAMES/C is insignificant.
There is no consistently positive pattern of
interfirm learning in our overall alliance sample.
The absence of any consistent pattern of change
in citation rates can be explained, however, by
the presence of both 'convergent' and 'divergent'
alliances in our sample (Equation 2). When the
absolute value of the difference between post-
and prealliance cross-citation rates, ABSDCRSS,
is regressed on the same variables in an OLS
estimation, we obtain a larger and statistically
significant coefficient for ALLIES, along with a
negative and marginally significant coefficient for





















































Participation in alliances thus produces signifi-
cant absolute-valued changes in firms' cross-
citation of partner-firm patents, supporting
Hypothesis 4b. These results provide some sup-
port for the arguments in Nakamura et al. (1996)
that participation in an alliance may produce
either convergence of capabilities through
interfirm knowledge transfer or divergence
through complementary specialization. In
addition, these results suggest that international
alliances result in less interfirm knowledge
exchange or specialization, reflecting the greater
logistical and cultural complexities of managing
such undertakings.
The remainder of our empirical analysis
focuses on factors that influence the extent of
interfirm transfer of technology-based capabilities.
Accordingly, we restrict our analysis to alliances
in which such transfers take place, i.e., those
exhibiting technological 'convergence'
(DPCTCRSS> 0). The determinants of the pres-
ence and degree of 'convergence' or 'divergence'
in alliance partners' technology-based capabilities
are important issues, but lie beyond the scope of
this paper. The results reported in Table 4 exclude
negative values of the dependent variable
(DPCTCRSS) and therefore are estimated with
the Tobit technique. The specifications address
the impact of alliance structure on patterns of
interfirm knowledge and capabilities transfer
(Hypotheses la and Ib) in the 191 alliances
characterized by convergent development.
Equation 3 regersses DPCTCRSS on EQUITY
(a dummy variable indicating alliances that
involve shared equity by partner firms) as well
as US-nonUS and SAMES/Co Consistent with
Hypothesis la, the positive and significant coef-
ficient for EQUITY implies that equity-based joint
ventures support higher levels of interfirm knowl-
edge and capabilities transfer than contract-based
alliances. The Tobit coefficient for SAMES/C
negative and significant, suggesting that conver-
gent alliances involving firms in the same product
lines or markets experience lower levels of
interfirm knowledge transfers than those spanning
4-digit SICS. The coefficient for US-non US
remains negative, but is no longer significant at
even the 0.1 confidence level.II
11 Estimation of the same model and a similar one using
ABSDCRSS as the dependent variable for the full sample of
792 alliances (using OLS) produces interesting results (not
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Equation 4 in Table 4 tests Hypothesis 1b,
which argues that 'unilateral' contracts will result
in lower levels of interfirm transfer of technologi-
cal capabilities than bilateral contract-based
(nonequity) alliances. Using the sample of 147
nonequity alliances exhibiting convergent devel-
opment, we regressed DPCTCRSS on UNlLAT,
SAMESIC and US-non US. The results are sup-
portive of our hypothesis; UNlLAT has a negative,
statistically significant coefficient (at the 0.05
level), and the coefficients for US-non US and
SAMESIC are similar to the results reported in
earlier specifications. 'Unilateral' alliances, which
can be placed at the 'market' end of a 'market-
hierarchy' continuum of alliance forms, thus seem
to support lower levels of interfirm knowledge
transfer, consistent with the earlier discussion of
the difficulties of acquiring technological capabili-
ties through market-based mechanisms. The
results support other empirical and theoretical
work that argues that the structure and governance
of alliances are influenced by and in tum influ-
ence their content and activities (Oxley, 1996).12
Results for the remaining hypotheses
(Hypotheses 2a-c and 3) are contained in Table
5. The dependent variable in each of the two
specifications is FIRMLRN, which measures
changes in the cross-citation behavior of a single
firm in an alliance (see Table 1); negative values
are included, and Equations 5 and 6 therefore are
estimated with OLS. Equation 5 tests for the
effects of 'absorptive capacity' on firms' ability
to learn from alliance partners. Since R&D and
sales data are available for a small subset of our
838 observations (due to the presence of a large
reported here in detail; available from the authors on request)
that bear on the convergence/divergence dichotomy. The
specification that uses DPCTCRSS as the dependent variable
again shows a positive and significant effect for EQUITY.
Estimation of a model using the absolute value of the change
in partner firms' cross-citations (ABSDCRSS) as the dependent
variable yields a coefficient for EQUITY that is slightly
smaller in magnitude and has a larger standard error. Taken
together, these results suggest that firms participating in
equity- based joint ventures tend to exhibit 'convergent', rather
than 'divergent' development of technological capabilities.
12 The negative coefficient obtained when this model was run
on the complete sample of nonequity alliances (results not
shown) suggests that unilateral alliances may in fact support
specialization, as defined by Nakamura et al. (1996). Firms
participating in 'unilateral' alliances exhibit divergence in
their patent cross-citation behavior, meaning that participation
in such alliances is consistent with a decision to buy (i.e.,
license), rather than develop the capabilities necessary to
'make' components of their technology portfolios.
number of foreign or privately held firms), this
model uses only PRECROSS (firm/s pre-1985
cross-citations of its partner firm's patents) as a
measure of absorptive capacity. The coefficient
for PRECROSS is positive and statistically sig-
nificant, supporting Hypothesis 2a concerning the
importance of absorptive capacity for firms'
ability to extract technological capabilities and
knowledge from alliance partners (the size and
significance of the coefficients for the other 'con-
trol' variables, SAMESIC and US-non US, are
largely consistent with previous OLS results).':'
Equation 6 includes measures of firm;'s R&D
intensity (RNDINT) and the natural logarithm of
its sales (LNSALES) as additional measures of
absorptive capacity. The coefficient for
PRECROSS remains positive and significant, but
the other results for Equation 6 do not support
Hypothesis 2b or 2c-the coefficient for RNDINT
is negative and nonsignificant, while that for
LNSALES is negative and significant. Larger firms
within this sample thus appear to absorb fewer
capabilities from their alliance partners, con-
trolling for other characteristics of absorptive
capacity and alliances, while relatively R&D-
intensive firms do not exhibit superior capabilities
absorption in alliances, ceteris paribus. Due in
part to the reduction in sample size, the coef-
ficients for both EQUITY and US-non US also are
not significant in Equation 6, although their signs
remain unchanged.
Our final hypothesis on the determinants of the
extent of interfirm knowledge transfer
(Hypothesis 3) tested the arguments of Hamel et
al. (1989) that Japanese firms exhibit consistently
superior abilities to learn 'more' through alliances
with U.S. firms than is true of firms from other
countries. Equations 5 and 6 shed light on this
issue: once we control for the lower overall
13 Other work with patent cross-citations (Mowery et al.,
1997) found that firms tend to team with alliance partners that
have similar technological portfolios, but there are 'decreasing
returns to similarity', i.e., we obtained a negative coefficient
for the square of prealliance cross-citations in a model analyz-
ing alliance partner choice. This tendency may apply to
absorptive capacity as well: the effects of prealliance techno-
logical overlap on knowledge transfer among partner firms
may be nonlinear, as opportunities for such transfer diminish
at higher levels of similarity in the technological portfolios
of alliance partners. We explored this possibility by adding
PRECRSS2 (the square of PRECROSS) to our model.
Although we obtained the 'correct' (i.e., negative) coefficient
on PRECRSS2, the coefficient failed all tests of statistical sig-
nificance.
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knowledge transfers achieved within US-nonUS
alliances (compared with those involving only
U.S. firms), we find 'that foreign firms
(FORGNCO) do not display significantly lower
levels of capabilities acquisition than U.S. firms.
Furthermore, the results in Table 5 provide no
support for the supposedly superior learning abili-
ties of Japanese companies. Japanese companies
(designated by the dummy variable JAPANCO)
have, if anything, a lower ability to acquire capa-
bilities from alliances with U.S. firms than do
other U.S. firms' foreign alliance partners: the
coefficient on JAPANCO is consistently negative,
although it fails to pass conventional tests of
statistical significance. Cross-national differences
in the ability to acquire capabilities through
alliances thus appear to be quite small, and if
such a difference exists at all for Japan, it is
precisely the opposite of that articulated in the
'received wisdom'.
CONCLUSION
Research on resource- and knowledge-based
views of the firm, along with related work on
interfirm alliances, has been hampered by the lack
of measures of firm-specific capabilities. These
difficulties have meant that discussion of the
motives and effects of alliance activity has pro-
ceeded in a virtual empirical vacuum, and com-
peting views of alliance activity have rarely been
brought into sharp focus. This paper uses a novel
technique for measuring change in firms' techno-
logical capabilities that allows us to track the
effects of alliance activity on interfirm knowledge
transfers and the transfer of technology-based
capabilities from one partner to another.
Our empirical results support two propositions
from the 'received wisdom' on interfirm knowl-
edge transfers in alliances. We find that equity
joint ventures appear to be more effective con-
duits for the transfer of complex capabilities than
are contract-based alliances such as licensing
agreements, consistent with Kogut (1988). Fur-
thermore, lower levels of transfer occur in unilat-
eral contracts than in bilateral nonequity arrange-
ments. This result in tum provides support for
the argument that the structure and content of
alliances are jointly determined, and that alliances
nearer the 'hierarchy' end of the 'market-
hierarchy' continuum (Oxley, 1996) outperform
alternatives in supporting interfirm learning, cet-
eris paribus.
The analysis also provides some support for
the importance of 'absorptive capacity' in the
acquisition of capabilities through alliances and
bolsters the argument that experience in related
technological areas is an important determinant
of absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal,
1990). A firm's ability to absorb capabilities from
its alliance partner depends on the prealliance
relationship between the two firms' patent port-
folios, consistent with Cohen and Levinthal' s
characterization of absorptive capacity as a qual-
ity that is both firm-specific and path-dependent.
Other measures of absorptive capacity perform
poorly, however, and further research on this
issue requires better measures of the structure
and activities of individual alliances.
Our results also suggest the need for a richer
conceptual framework in considering the effects
of alliance activity on firm-specific knowledge
and capabilities. Significant interfirm transfer of
knowledge and technological capabilities occurs
in only a subset of alliances, characterized by
'convergent development' (Nakamura et al.,
1996). The presence of some alliances in our
sample in which the firms display 'divergent
development', Le., declining technological over-
lap, suggests that some alliances are vehicles for
accessing rather than acquiring capabilities. The
'learning' that takes place within alliances thus
appears to be more complex than most of the
literature on this topic suggests, underlining the
need for better definitions of learning in theoreti-
cal discussions of alliance activity and high-
lighting this as an area ripe for further study.
Finally, with respect to an issue that is widely
cited in popular commentary on international
alliances, we find little evidence that Japanese
firms have siphoned off important technological
capabilities from their U.S. alliance partners,
thereby contributing to the 'hollowing out' of
U.S. corporations. Perhaps reflecting their new
status of technological leadership (or parity) in
many industries, Japanese partners now offer their
alliance partners valuable opportunities for learn-
ing that our data suggest have been exploited by
U.S. firms. In one other respect, however, our
results do tend to support the conventional wis-
dom: U.S. firms' alliances with non-U.S. firms
seem to result in lower levels of interfirm knowl-
edge transfer than those involving only U.S. com-
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panies. This finding is consistent with arguments
made by Gulati (1996) and others about the
obstacles to interfirm knowledge transfer created
by distance, cultural differences, and other factors.
Despite a substantial literature on these topics,
the empirical analysis of strategic alliances, firm-
specific capabilities, and interfirm knowledge
transfers continues to rely heavily on case studies
and imperfect indicators of the underlying
phenomena. The empirical analysis reported here
is one of the first systematic tests of various
assertions in this literature. In addition to shed-
ding light on these specific issues, this study's
measures of changing firm-specific technological
capabilities have considerable promise for broader
application to the analysis of firm strategy and
technological innovation, and may provide a
stronger empirical underpinning for this provoca-
tive conceptual literature.
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